




Price-coordination and investment coordination are analyzed in a mo-
nopolistic multi-sector general equilibrium model with consumption com-
plementarities.
Possible solutions to the investment coordination problem are consis-
tent with historical examples of government intervention in investment,
the di⁄erent roles of banking sectors in di⁄erent countries, and the e⁄ect
of optimism on the development of new sectors.
Price coordination within sectors between monopolists of complemen-
tary intermediaries lowers prices and increases welfare because the com-
petition between the ￿nal goods of di⁄erent sectors then becomes the
paramount concern of each monopolist. With no price coordination, each
monopolist sets in￿nite prices as the e⁄ect of price increases on demand
is shared by all other intermediary monopolists due to the complementar-
ities.
11 Introduction
Each island in the ￿ctitious islandgroup of Tawahu provides a holidays for
tourists. One island o⁄ers cray￿shing and deep sea diving, another has high
waves suitable for sur￿ng, yet another provides a sandy beach. Each island
hence provides a unique holiday experience which is not perfectly substitutable.
On each island there is one airport operated by one airliner, one road exploited
by one taxi-company, one hotel, and one leisure facility. Each holiday needs one
of each four services to be complete.
Consider ￿rst the investment problem on each island: a prospective airliner
will only build an airport if he expects someone else to build the road and an-
other to build the hotel. The prospective hotel owner will only build a hotel if
he expects someone else to provide a leisure activity. Coordinating these invest-
ments may be done by a local government, a bank, or a very large corporation
who sets up all facilities at once but pays overhead costs due to being large. If it
is not possible for one investor to put up all facilities then the more diverse the
investors needed, the harder the coordination will be, which may be a reason
why on some islands there are still no foreign investors developing the island
even though it is known that all facilities are technically possible.
Consider next the price problem of each service provider on each island: if
a service provider, say the hotel manager, increases prices, this will reduce the
number of customers for everyone else on the island as well. In the absence of
price coordination on an island, this will lead to high prices and few tourists. If
all services on one island coordinate however, they can attract customers from
2other islands and increase pro￿ts by lowering prices. As a result, coordination
between services on an island seems a likely outcome. The e⁄ect when there is
price coordination on each island however is that there are lower prices and more
customers on all islands and, as we shall see, lower pro￿ts for each individual
service provider. If however all service providers on all islands coordinate with
everyone else, prices will again be very high and there will be few customers on
all islands. Hence the no-coordination and complete-coordination cases lead to
similar outcomes.
Consider ￿nally the discovery of a new island. Investments are uncertain: it
is not known beforehand whether the soil is suitable for an airport or a road;
it is not known whether the climate would allow a hotel or whether there are
enjoyable leisure activities. The ￿rst one to invest (an airliner) will have least
security about the feasibility of the ￿nal product (a pleasurable holiday). Once
the airport, the road, and the hotel are found to be feasible and built however,
the provider of the last facility to be discovered (leisure) will have the security
that if he ￿nds a leisure activity, a ￿nal product is feasible. As a result, the
number of leisure activity operators trying to ￿nd a leisure activity will be large
as each competes for the leisure monopoly if there is a leisure activity. Due to
increasing returns to scale, there will only remain one leisure activity operator
if it is discovered. Hence, even assuming coordination is possible, there is a
growing level of investment with each discovered facility on the island and the
amount of investment will be ine¢ cient due to the monopoly once discovered.
In this paper the arguments contained in the story of the islandgroup of
3Tawahu are formalized in a simple multi-sector monopolistic one-period general
equilibrium model with consumption complementarities1. The main di⁄erence
with previous studies (e.g. Cooper and John (1988), Lin (1995) and Krugman
and Venables (1995)), where complementarities are modelled as demand linkages
between sectors, is that the complementarities in this paper are only assumed
to exist within sectors and the monopolies are natural.
The model is presented in the second section. The investment and pricing
coordination issues are discussed in the third section. The e⁄ect of comple-
mentarities on investment during innovation periods is discussed in the fourth
section. In the ￿fth section the welfare implications are discussed and some
comments are made on the model￿ s implications for international trade and
endogenous growth. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 The model
There are n+1 sectors. In the zero sector, labour and capital is combined in a




0 with ￿ + ￿ < 1
where L0 equals labour employed in sector 0 and K0 equals the amount of
capital employed in sector 0. The total amount of labour and capital available
1For an overview of the literature on complementarities, known also as demand linkages
or demand externalities, see Miyagawa (1993) or Milgrom and Roberts (1995). For empirical
support for the importance of complementarities, see e.g. Bartelsman et al. (1994), Cooper
and Haltiwanger (1996), Cooper and Johri (1997), and Miyagawa (1996).
4equals K and L which is ￿xed as only a one period model is used.
If we interpret this zero sector as the agricultural sector, an assumption of
decreasing returns to scale indeed seems to ￿t known productivity pro￿les of
this sector. A di⁄erent interpretation of the zero sector is that it denotes the
informal or ￿ grey￿sector.
For the i>0 sector, called the industrial sectors, each sector subdivides into
k intermediary producers who combine a ￿xed amount of labour and capital in
an increasing returns to scale technology:
Yij = X￿
ij with ￿ > 1
with Yij denoting the output of the j￿ th intermediary ￿rm in sector i, and
Xij = min(Lij;Kij); which implicitly assumes that production requires one unit
of labour to one unit of capital. The ￿nal good Yi consists of a combination of
one of the k intermediary goods, i.e., Yi = min(Yi1;::;Yik).2 Also for simplicity,
the costs of assembling are put at zero, with perfect competition at the assembly
stage. This makes it possible to interpret the complementarity as one arising
in the consumption of goods, i.e., each intermediary producer sells directly to
consumers and consumers need to combine intermediaries to obtain a ￿nal good.
2Allowing capital and labour to be substitutable in the production of intermediaries, or for
an assembler to vary the inputs of di⁄erent intermediaries was tried, but only added complica-
tions to the analysis of the competitive behaviour without changing the results qualitatively.
An advantage of having ￿xed proportions of capital and labour is that for many analyses, the
model can be interpreted as a single input model.
The important aspect of combining intermediaries is that the number of ￿nal goods pro-
duced rises more than proportionally with the number of intermediaries in that sector. The
extreme assumption that all k intermediaries are indispensable for a ￿nal good is taken for
simplicity.
5In the island example, each sector is an island and there are four intermediary
goods needed for a ￿nal good (air ticket, taxi, hotel, and leisure facility).
We will assume that the competitive process has yielded a single monopolist
of each intermediary good, although we will consider deviations of this when
discussing invention periods. The monopolies can arise from the increasing
returns to scale, patent-entry-barriers, or ￿ qwerty-barriers￿ , where a qwerty-
barrier denotes the situation that all users of the ￿nal and intermediary goods
have invested in a consumption technology that only functions with a particular
type of intermediary (see Davids (1985)). Keeping such a consumption tech-
nology avoids the search costs of ￿nding a new consumption technology and
may also enjoy network externalities. This protects each of the nk monopolists
from a competitor wishing to contest the monopoly. Translated to the island
example, the current hotel on island x is mentioned in the brochures of the air
company and the leisure company on island x. Also, the hotel can provide as
many places as could possibly be demanded at decreasing marginal costs. For
a potential competiting hotelier this means that he not only has to commit by
building a new hotel, but that even when the new hotel is built, the old hotel
can always produce the same good for less money as it has regular customers
who do not wish to incur the search costs of looking for new accommodation and
because the new hotel has to advertise continuously in order to compensate for
the fact that it is not yet mentioned in the brochures. Therefore, independently
of the price the old hotel sets, a new hotel knows it will be driven out of the
market once it enters and hence will not enter.
6This setup is explicitly based on the empirical ￿nding that industrial sectors
often experience increasing returns to scale whereas agricultural and informal
sectors do not: see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a discussion of this topic.














Hence with respect to the choice between the agricultural good and the
intermediate goods, there are Cobb-Douglas preferences, whereas there are CES-
preferences for the n goods. The constraint on ￿ ensures that it is not possible
for one industrial sector to drive all other industrial sectors out of the market.
In the island example, individuals want food (sector zero) and holidays (sectors
i>0) and the holidays o⁄ered are su¢ ciently diverse to prevent one island from
being able to attract all customers. There is no disutility of work. The budget
constraint equals:
m = Y0 +
X
YiPi
with m the budget and Pi the price of good i. The price of the zero good is
taken to be the numeraire.
The conditions for labour market clearing and capital market clearing are:
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which takes account of the fact that in equilibrium each sector and each
intermediary produces the same amount and hence that total labour and capital
in the n sectors equals nkY
1
￿
i . Throughout it is assumed that the agricultural
sector is big enough so that no individual intermediary producer or sector takes
account of its in￿ uence on the price of capital or labour, which facilitates the
analysis greatly. Similarly, no individual intermediary producer or sector will
take its e⁄ect on the budget constraint into account.
From the utility function, we can calculate the demand for each individual
sector depending on its price:

















The ￿rst coordination problem, the investment problem, arises when setting up
an industrial sector and follows directly from the way industrial sectors are mod-
elled. Suppose no intermediate good producers yet exist in sector i and consider
the problem of each potential investor in sector i who loses a ￿xed cost when
setting up an intermediary ￿rm: if the potential investor in an intermediary
￿rm believes that no-one else invest in other intermediaries, he will only invest
in the sector if he is able to borrow enough money to set up the entire sector.
Such sector-monopolists face severe borrowing constraints and pay high over-
head costs which make them unlikely to occur: as Miyagawa (1993) and Stiglitz
(1994) have argued, overhead costs, borrowing constraints, and the underly-
ing information problems are the implicit defence for the standard assumption
that there is more than 1 ￿rm in the economy as a whole. Simply because of
increased market power, a single ￿rm could always outperform others in the
absence of information problems and overhead costs. The assumption therefore
that the same problems also prevent ￿rms which produce complementary goods
from merging or starting as a single ￿rm, is standard. Then, an investor will
only set up a new ￿rm if he thinks that it is su¢ ciently likely that all the other
intermediary ￿rms will be set-up as well3. Three solutions to this coordination
3We may note that individuals in the informal sector have an incentive to let others believe
that they are going to set up ￿rms producing intermediary goods: if they would set up such
goods, it becomes more likely for other potential investors that their investments will prove
pro￿table. This would increase investments, raising the price of capital and labour in the
9problem seem plausible. Firstly a government can step in, either by setting
up a sector-monopolist who invests in the production of all intermediaries, or
by simultaneously channeling investments into many di⁄erent private compa-
nies. This seems one of the aspects of investment policies in Japan and South
Korea for the last 50 years, where the governments either set up very large
groups of companies or channeled investment simultaneously to many ￿rms via
the keiretsu and chaebol systems in Japan and South Korea respectively. If
the government knows a certain intermediate technology exists, which will be
the case if the sector as a whole exists in other countries, there will not be
a principle-agent problem. If the sector is entirely new on the world-market
however, misinvestment may occur on a large scale because the government has
little information about the feasibility of the production techniques it subsidizes
and hence faces large principle-agent problems. This may provide a partial
explanation for the recent slow-down in economic growth in Japan and South
Korea: for Japan at least, Callon (1995) argued that the industrial policies of
the MITI and other government departments have proved ine⁄ective after the
1970s in the sense that large investments in new technologies have not paid o⁄.
A di⁄erent way of solving the investment coordination problem may be a
developed banking sector, where banks, either in cooperation with other banks
or alone, coordinate investment in sectors. There are indeed banks, even in
informal sector, even if the individuals in the informal sector do not actually invest in a new
intermediary. Announcing that one will invest in an intermediary will also discourage others
from investing in that intermediary. This will allow the ￿rm who announced his investment
plans not to actually go through with his investments until he has observed others making
investments in other intermediaries. Hence there is also a hold-up problem here. Both possi-
bilities combine to make talk cheap and therefore incredible. There is good reason therefore
to expect the market to be unable to solve the coordination problem.
10highly industrialized societies, which specialize in particular sectors and hence
gather private information as to the viability of certain projects. Because the
bank exists in a competitive environment, its incentive to ￿nd such informa-
tion will be higher than that for a central government. Banks may then be
interpreted as centres where information about whole sectors is gathered, which
saves all individual companies in a sector from making the search costs for this
information and allows for more e¢ cient coordination. This situation seems a
possible description of investment practices in Germany (see for instance Ed-
wards and Fisher (1994) for a discussion of the active role of banks in investment
in Germany).
Thirdly, the investment coordination problem may be solved by a culture of
optimism, a situation where investors expect there to be some other investor who
will invest in other intermediaries. In equilibrium there then always will be some
other investor who has invested in a di⁄erent intermediary, hence validating the
optimistic expectations. Perhaps this investment coordination mechanism is
prevalent in the US, where the role of banks and government in investments
seems relatively limited. Non-institutionalized investment coordination may for
instance have lead to implementation cycles and investment bunching (Shleifer
(1986), Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996)).
3.2 price coordination
Consider ￿rst the case where there are n+1 sectors and no intermediary producer
coordinates. The pro￿t function of an individual intermediary ￿rm reads:
11￿ij = PijYi ￿ Y
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we may note that the individual intermediary ￿rms takes no account of the
demand e⁄ect on the other intermediary ￿rms in his sector of an increase in his
own price. In equilibrium all the intermediary prices have to be the same and
therefore Pi = kPij and Yi = ￿m
nPi. This means we can rearrange the ￿rst order
condition to ￿nd

















(w + r) > 0
which only has a solution for ￿ > k￿1
k￿ 1
n
which corresponds to a very high
degree of substitutability of ￿nal goods. Hence for most reasonable values of ￿;
d￿ij
dPij > 0 and there is no ￿nite equilibrium price and the individual intermediary
￿rm will put up its prices to in￿nity and produce virtually nothing. The pro￿t
made in each ￿rm then equals ￿m
nk : The economic intuition is that the actions of
one intermediary cannot increase the demand for other intermediaries, but can
12only decrease the demand for the other intermediaries. Each ￿rm increases its
prices as a reaction to the price increases of all others in the economy. There is
a price-race to in￿nity if ￿rms do not coordinate. Only if the substitutability of
￿nal goods is very high, will there be a ￿nite equilibrium price.
If all intermediaries within a sector coordinate, their sector can obtain a
much higher share of the budget if other intermediaries in other sectors do not
coordinate. Then all intermediary ￿rms will try to coordinate within their own
sectors. The ￿rst order condition for a sector whose intermediaries coordinate













































which decreases in ￿; m;￿ and n and increases in k. The increase in k
is because production becomes relatively more expensive when there are more
intermediaries due to the lesser degree to which the increasing returns to scale
are enjoyed. The other results are like that of monopolistic competition. Hence,
we get the counter-intuitive result that coordination between monopolists in
each sector improves the outcomes of the economy in the sense that prices
of goods are lower, output is higher and aggregate welfare is higher. This is
13also a self-sustaining equilibrium because when the coordination breaks down
in any particular sector, the resulting price increases in that sector will reduce
the pro￿ts of all the intermediary ￿rms in that sector and will increase pro￿ts
elsewhere. This result critically rests on the assumption that each intermediary
good is produced by a monopolist however, as unrestricted competition for all
intermediary goods would not lead to high prices.
If all nk intermediaries coordinate with all other intermediaries, it is no
longer reasonable to assume that m and w are taken constant. If we solve the
maximization problem of the n sectors combined, inserting the now endogenous
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14The second line is always negative. The combined third to ￿fth line are also
always negative. To see this, note that they are positive if and only if







i )￿1: We can easily see that because (1-￿)>￿
and (1-￿)>￿ this inequality will never be satis￿ed for any value of Z, ￿; and
￿. Therefore @￿
@Yi < 0 and output in the industrial sectors will become minimal
and prices will be in￿nite.
Although this case seems very unrealistic, it may be a mechanism through
which a top-layer of industrialists in a country is able to extract surplus from the
rest of the population: by monopolizing the modern sectors, preferably keeping
the number of modern sectors low in order to avoid coordination problems and
reduce spreading of the surplus, an elite would be able to extract high rents
for low e⁄ort. Of course such an economy-wide monopoly would have to be
sustained by high entry barriers and by barriers to imports (except perhaps
imports for the consumption of the elite).
4 The process of inventing a new sector
New sectors are set up at the beginning of the period in consideration and the
invention process is assumed to take place in negligible time. Consider the case
when there are initially n-1 industrial sectors and the possibility of starting a
new industrial sector arises and it is believed that this will be the only possible
15new sector. The new sector is discovered in a hierarchical manner, i.e., the
j￿ th intermediary in sector i can only be sought when the (j-1) intermediaries
of sector i are already found. It is not actually necessary that intermediates
are indeed hierarchically ordered, only that discoveries are made sequentially:
investors can join in the search for intermediary x as long as x is not yet found.
In the development of computers for instance, the invention process took decades
and had several sequential steps involved (Williams (1985)).
Investors in the j￿ th intermediary know how many other investors there are
in the j￿ th intermediary, know whether investment will take place for subsequent
intermediaries and know that there is a probability p for each intermediary that
it does not exist. The intermediary will always be found if it exists, as long as
there is at least one investor who searches it. Searching a new technology carries
a ￿xed labour and a ￿xed capital cost, equal to C=cLw + cKr: In line with the
arguments of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Arrow (1968), this is considered a
sunk cost. For simplicity, the e⁄ect of the new sector on capital and wages is
su¢ ciently small to neglect and there is price-coordination within sectors, but
not between sectors. This implies that the possible pro￿ts of each intermediary
￿rm in the new sector equals ￿ = m￿
nk ￿
￿(n￿1)
k(n￿￿)mn￿￿; which is declining in k and
n, as expected.
The problem of the investment behavior of successive investors is solved
by means of backward induction. If the k-1 other intermediaries are already
found, the value of ￿nding the last intermediary equals ￿(1 ￿ p): Hence there
are then
￿(1￿p)




C , which increases with j. This complies with the
impression that in research markets the number of entrants and the research
activities is greatest when the ￿nal applications are nearest: With probability
(1 ￿ p)j￿1p; the process of ￿nding all the intermediaries breaks down for inter-
mediary j, which entails a total cost of
Pj




p in research costs if all intermediaries are discov-





j=0(1￿p)k￿j+ig which occurs when not all intermediaries are
found.











￿k spent research costs per discovered new sector, which is the direct result of
the free entry assumption at the invention stage. This level of investment is
not e¢ cient for two reasons. Firstly, there is over-investment for each inter-
mediary good due to the sunk costs and due to the assumption that p does
not depend on the number of investors. Secondly, the value of the new sector
to the investors is greater than the value to the economy as a whole, which
is due to the negative e⁄ect of the declining output in all other sectors that
occurs when a new sector is discovered. These ine¢ ciencies are a direct result
from the market distortion after invention, i.e., the monopolies. To a certain
extent such e¢ ciency losses of innovation are unavoidable in market economies,
because the incentive for innovation comes from the market imperfection: with
no market imperfection after invention, no pro￿ts can be made of inventions
and hence no inventions: see also Walde (1998), Cheng and Dinopoulos (1996)),
17and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) for extensive analyses of invention cycles
and their inherent ine¢ ciencies. The invention process doubles the ine¢ ciency
of monopolies because an ine¢ cient amount of resources is spent to become the
monopolist in order to obtain the ine¢ cient rents associated with monopolies.
Another possible dynamic feature arising from the invention process may
be seen by interpreting the new sector as producing the same ￿nal good as an
already existing ￿ old￿sector more cheaply. If for instance the productivity in
the new sector is only very slightly above that in the old sector, and the ￿nal
goods are otherwise identical, the new sector will still completely replace the old
sector when it arrives because it can always undercut the old technology (see
Walde (1998) for a similar argument connected with new production techniques).
Macro-economic ￿ uctuations may then not only arise due to the labour and
capital destruction during R&D, but also may arise if the labour and capital
replacement from the old sector to the new takes some time and causes frictional
unemployment, as in Aghion and Howitt (1994).
5 Welfare analysis
Here we address the question how the complementarities, monopolies, and en-
suing search ine¢ ciencies a⁄ect the number of sectors. We consider four cases.
First we look at the optimal number of sectors as a social planner would set
them, assuming that each sector is known to exist and hence only the costs C
need to be paid for each intermediary. For simplicity and tractability we reduce
18the model here to a one-factor input, i.e. K=L and ck = cl = c: Aggregate
welfare then becomes:























If new technologies are uncertain, then for expected utility the only thing








k(1￿p)k : In both cases therefore the socially
optimal number of sectors rises with L, ￿ and ￿; and decreases with (￿ + ￿), c,
k, and ￿: These relationships all seem intuitively plausible.
Comparing these outcomes with the outcome in the absence of a social plan-
ner, it is assumed that there is coordination within but not between sectors.
Equating the cost of investing in the ￿rst intermediary with the marginal ben-
e￿t yields
c







which, unfortunately, yields an intractable four-degree polynomial for n as a
19solution when m and (w+r) are inserted.4
Although there is no tractable solution for n in general in the case of uncer-
tainty, we can consider qualitatively the question whether the absence of social
planning would result in more or less sectors. First, if new sector are certain, i.e.
p=0, then new sectors will be introduced until the pro￿t of a new intermediary
equals costs. In that case, the amount of labour and capital lost in the discovery
of each new sector is the same as in the social planners case because investors
take into account how many new sectors in total will be found at the beginning
of the new period and hence will all invest at the point where the marginal
bene￿ts precisely outweigh the costs and when thus only one investor invests in
each intermediary. In that case there is no ine¢ ciency in the invention process
and therefore the number of sectors found will be higher than in the social plan-
ners case, because investors will not concern themselves with the negative e⁄ect
of new sectors on the pro￿ts of other sectors. In the case of no uncertainty
therefore, the number of new sectors will be greater than in the social planners
case. If p>0 there are two opposing forces. Without planning, setting up sectors
costs more capital and labour due to the ine¢ ciency in the invention process5,
which will increase the costs of labour and capital which decreases the number
4In order to get some analytical feeling for the solution, take the case when (￿+￿)=1, and
n￿1






2L￿￿￿ ; which is lower than the
social planner n for very large p and k due to the large ine¢ ciencies. It is higher for values
of ￿￿ close to 1 (because then the social planner n goes to zero). For relatively high values of
ck
(1￿p)k , the market n converges to
L￿(1￿p)k
ck ; which is lower than the social planner n under
all conditions.
5The e¢ ciency loss of the invention process in the market will equal c(k ￿ f
Pk
i=1 pi(1 ￿
p)k￿i(k ￿ i + 1) + k(1 ￿ p)kg) per new sector, which is zero with p=0 or k=1 and then rises
with p and k.
20of new sectors. On the other hand, each individual investor does not take the
e⁄ect of the new sector on the pro￿tability of the old sectors into account. If k
and/or p are small therefore, the ￿rst e⁄ect will be small as the e¢ ciency loss is
then small. If ￿ and/or ￿ are low, the decrease in the pro￿tability of the other
sectors due to extra new sectors will be low and hence the second e⁄ect will be
low.
5.1 International trade and endogenous growth
If the model above is correct, international trade between identical countries
leads to complete specialization. In order to see this, imagine there are two
economies with the structure above which are identical in capital and labour
endowments and each have n identical sectors. Assume iceberg transport costs
equal to fraction t, intermediaries can price discriminate between countries,
there is no government intervention in trade and there is within-sector price-
coordination. Then, if t>1- 1
2￿￿1, no intermediary producer ij could increase
pro￿ts by doubling his production and underprice the foreign producer of ij6
and hence no trade at all will take place. If t<1- 1
2￿￿1, intermediaries can make
positive pro￿ts by exporting and complete specialization will occur because the
increasing returns to scale ensures that there then can be only one producer of
each intermediary. Each of the two countries will end up on average with n/2
6The implicit assumption here is that a monopolist will start exporting if he can produce
the exported goods at lower costs than his foreign competitor, because then he can drive his
competitor out of the market. Because there is only price coordination, the amount one can
sell in another country is ￿xed by the prevailing output of the other intermediaries in that
sector in that country. For the threshold level this means that the amount of exports must be
exactly as high as home sales. If whole sectors can coordinate on exports as well, the threshold
level will probably be lower.
21sectors. The reason is that if one country had more than n/2 sectors, wages and
capital costs would be higher and each intermediary product could be made more
cheaply in the other country. It is pro￿table for all the intermediary producers
in sector i to be in one country as that will be the country were consumption
of that ￿nal good is greater due to the lower prices in that country which are
the result of the zero transportation costs within a country. This makes total
costs lower for sectors which are completely based in one country, rather than
divided over two countries. This means that if one particular country has more
intermediaries of a sector than the other, all intermediary ￿rms in that sector
could increase pro￿ts by moving to that particular country.
Because of the limited substitutability between labour and capital in the
model, long term growth can only occur when the labour force grows, such
as for instance occurs if countries increasingly specialize and hence increases
the population base of the combined economies. Within the model, economic
growth is therefore attributed to increasing regionalization, meaning less sectors
in each region, state or country separately. Because there are no complemen-
tarities between sectors, such as when each ￿nal good is an intermediary in the
production of other ￿nal goods (see e.g. Cooper and John (1988) and Krug-
man and Venables (1995) for such speci￿cations), specialization could bene￿t
all countries and regions because it takes advantage of the increasing returns
to scale in each sector. Specialization is very unlikely to be the only source of
economic growth however, and the model￿ s usefulness for analyzing endogenous
growth issues is therefore limited. For analyses of other possible endogenous
22growth dynamics associated with complementarities, see Redding (1996) and
Durlauf (1993).
The only candidate to explain underdevelopment and the lack of foreign in-
vestment in some LDCs in this model is the coordination problem of investment:
if one intermediary producer invests in a ￿rm in an LDC, but other intermediary
producers do not, the single ￿rm has to import all the other intermediaries from
abroad in order to make a ￿nal good, incurring high transportation costs. If all
intermediary ￿rms invest in the same LDC, the cost of the ￿nal good does not
have to include the transportation costs and would be more pro￿table. Hence,
the model would lead us to expect to see bunching of investment: either all
intermediaries of a sector are set up at the same time in the same country or
region or none is. Indeed, such investment bunching has been observed in the
US by Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996). The increasing returns to scale make
it more pro￿table to invest simultaneously in a populous region than in a non-
populous region. As South East Asia is more densely populated than Africa or
Latin America, this could be a factor in their recent growth records.
Another aspect of the model which may be important for international trade
is the timing of investments: if there are international patent considerations or
qwerty barriers or low transportation costs, the speed of investment may provide
a competitive advantage for a country as a whole. In that case, optimism seems
the fastest way of coordinating, given that government and banking intervention
may take time because investments can only be subsidised or coordinated some
time after they are identi￿ed as in need of subsidies or coordination.
236 Conclusions and discussion
Put in terms of the example of the ￿ctitious islandgroup of Tawahu, the key
assumption in this paper is that a holiday on any island needs all the facilities
present (air ticket, taxi, hotel, leisure activity) where each facility is operated
by a di⁄erent monopolist.
The assumed complementarities (taxis and hotels on one island are both
needed for a holiday) and natural monopolies (increasing returns to scale lead
to only one hotel and leisure facility) in the non-agricultural sectors (islands)
had two important implications. The ￿rst implication is that it is necessary
to coordinate investment, either by means of intervention from government or
banks, or by means of mutually optimistic expectations on the side of many
investors in a sector. Obviously, coordination will be even harder to achieve
when it concerns investments abroad that have to coincide with investments of
many other foreign ￿rms, which is a possible explanation for the lack of (foreign)
investments in some LDCs. Within a country however, when investors can
coordinate without intervention, the monopolies which investors obtain after
setting up a ￿rm induce ine¢ ciencies because too much investment will take
place within a sector.
The second implication is that price coordination within sectors is bene￿cial
for welfare as it decreases prices and increases output compared to the no-
price-coordination case. Price-coordination between sectors leads to very high
prices and very low output and corresponds to the situation whereby a small
industrial elite obtains part of the surplus produced by the agricultural sector
24by means of monopolizing the industrial sectors. In the complete absence of any
price-coordination and as long as the substitutability of ￿nal goods is not near-
perfect, each intermediary will produce virtually nothing and will put up its
prices to in￿nity. Therefore the situation with complete coordination between
all industrial ￿rms is the same as without any coordination.
The assumptions on complementarities in this paper are extreme. The ad-
vantage is that this makes clear what the maximum e⁄ect is of complementari-
ties. The disadvantage is that there is a loss of realism. The results in this paper
should therefore be taken only as an indication of the possible consequences of
complementarities and natural monopolies.
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